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Abstract—In order to increase the value of scientific datasets
and improve research outcomes, it is important that only trust-
worthy data is used. This paper presents mechanisms by which
scientists and the organisations they represent can certify the
authenticity of characteristics and provenance of any datasets
they publish so that secondary users can inspect and gain
confidence in the qualities of data they source. By drawing
on data models and protocols used to provide self-sovereign
ownership of identity and personal data to individuals, we
conclude that providing self-sovereignty to digital assets offers
a viable approach for institutions to certify qualities of their
datasets in a cryptographically secure manner, and enables
secondary data users to efficiently perform verification of the
authenticity of such certifications. By building upon emerging
standards for decentralized identification and cryptographically
verifiable credentials, we envisage an infrastructure of tools being
developed to foster adoption of metadata certification schemes,
and improving the quality of information provided in support of
shared data assets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owners and publishers of scientific datasets and digital
assets have an opportunity to increase the scientific value [1]
of their dataset or further the commercial opportunities [2] for
other types of digital asset by demonstrating the faithfulness
of claims about their data, or the authenticity of their assets,
through mechanisms which can act as digital watermarks [3].
In order to have confidence in the quality and suitability of a
dataset for their needs, potential users and other stakeholders
need to have trust in claims made by the originators of
the dataset. In practice, even in environments where funding
organisations insist on researchers sharing data, there can
be a resistance to reuse as Pisani et al. [4] found “lower-
than-expected reuse of shared data may be because potential
secondary users have few ways of checking the quality of
those data”. As such, a scheme which allows potential users
to access dataset properties and attributes in the form of signed
credentials, with an assurance that the credentials related
to the data that they were inspecting, were issued by an
authorised party and had not been revoked, or tampered with
since issuance has the potential to increase the use of shared
datasets.
This paper discusses methods for providing signed certi-
fications relating to properties or attributes of digital assets.
The discussion considers a scientific dataset, and reviews
mechanisms by which parties with ownership or authority
over the dataset can attach digital credentials to the dataset so
that prospective users and other interested parties can access
and verify the credentials to gain confidence in the dataset’s
qualities. The credential used to illustrate the discussion is an
assertion from the originators of a hypothetical dataset that
the data it contains has been ethically sourced and is cleared
for further use — a need identified by Scott et al. [5] when
considering the implications of recorded voices in a published
dataset being used in different scenarios.
The paper continues as follows: Section II introduces current
mechanisms for describing properties and metadata about
shared datasets, and provisions for evidencing attributes of
datasets to provide provenance. Section III discusses estab-
lished methods for secure information publishing using public
and private key signatures, and identifies shortcomings in
these methods when applied to sharing assertions about shared
digital assets and datasets. The proposed approach uses Self-
sovereign Identity (SSI) [6], and the enabling concepts of
decentralised identifiers (DIDs) [7] and verifiable credentials
(VCs) [8] which are introduced in Section IV. Section V
explains how these SSI data models and protocols can be
adapted to provide a mechanism that allows the publisher
of a dataset to issue credentials attesting that their dataset
has certain properties. Section VI extends the discussion to
consider automation of credential exchange by treating data
assets as self-sovereign entities, with software agents medi-
ating the presentation and verification of credentials between
publishers and potential dataset users. The paper concludes
with a discussion of our ongoing work in this area as we
seek to further integrate existing data sharing schemes with
verifiable credentials so that they can be used together to
provide improved confidence and trust in shared scientific
datasets.
II. SHARING DATASETS, ATTRIBUTES AND PROVENANCE
Petabytes of data are generated every day by various sci-
entific facilities ranging from telescopes to the worlds largest
machine viz. Hadron Collider [9]. However, due to a lack of
proven methods to assess the quality of data and inadequate
archival processes, secondary users can effectively utilize only
a small subset of the collected data. For the data to be useful
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to its full extent it should be verifiable for its origin and
trustworthiness [10], especially when it is applied in the field
of scientific research.
Methods are available to add unique attributes to shared
datasets, which add a certain level of confidence to the quality
of data. Such methods are briefly explained in the following
section. The Digital Object Identifier (DOI) System is widely
used for identification and management of intellectual content
and metadata, and to connect end-users with the requested con-
tent. It provides a technical and social framework to identify
data by using persistent, interoperable identifiers that can be
used across digital networks [9]. Within dataset records located
by DOIs, different domains have their own specifications and
requirements for metadata. Earth Science Information Partners,
founded by NASA, recommends the use of the Provenance
and Context Content Standard (PCCS) matrix to perform
identification, capturing and tracking of all metadata that can
be used to validate the data and to facilitate efficient scientific
reproducibility [10]. NASA has use of the PCCS matrix as
a requirement for all new Earth science missions, using it to
capture and record metadata such as dataset product documen-
tation, dataset product validation which includes the validation
record and datasets, dataset calibration information such as
calibration method, data, and software used. Additionally,
the OpenGIS Sensor Model Language (SensorML) Encoding
standard is used to demonstrate various important attributes of
sensor and sensory systems such as geometric, dynamic and
observational characteristics [11].
In the Biometrics field, Czajka et al. [12] introduce a digital
watermarking method that can prove the trustworthiness of
iris images without requiring to add supporting data to the
iris image. This watermarking based method was designed
to certify that biometric data had originated from a genuine
sensor. Zhuang et al. [13] discuss the experimentation and
evaluation of some of the existing feature extraction methods
that are used to measure facial weaknesses. Since an open
source annotated facial weakness images dataset was unavail-
able, experimentation involved first creating a facial weakness
dataset using images and videos from public repositories like
Google Images and YouTube. The generated “neurologist-
certified dataset” was subjected to multiple reviews by ex-
perienced neurology trainees and also experts in the field of
neurology. If the dataset created during this study is to be
effectively shared and applied in future experiments, there
would be value in providing demonstrable proof that it was
reviewed and certified by neurology experts.
Existing methods used to provide provenance and demon-
strate the trustworthiness of datasets are designed to cater to
the need of specific use cases or domains. Although these
methods are being successfully implemented in their respective
fields, there is a lack of a common framework or verification
mechanism that can be seamlessly applied across all areas of
research and other fields. In order to foster the development
of such a framework, and to facilitate the provision of high-
quality toolsets, it is proposed to provide a mechanism by
which datasets and core attributes of metadata about those
datasets can be certified and verified with cryptographic as-
surance using open standards-based models and protocols.
III. CERTIFICATION OF DIGITAL ASSETS
When evaluating a certification or attestation about an entity,
it is critical that the certificate can be inextricably linked to the
entity which it describes, otherwise the certificate is of limited
value — a photographic identity card, for example, is only of
use in attesting the identity of its holder if the inspector of the
identity card believes that the photograph on the card provides
a visual match to the holder. For digital assets, it is common
to use a cryptographic hash value [14] derived from the asset
itself to provide a unique digital fingerprint of the asset, and
it is proposed to apply this technique to the identification of
the datasets discussed in this study. A cryptographic hash is a
unique fixed length value that can be generated for a dataset
and which will change if the data in the dataset changes in any
way, even by a single bit. If the hash value is recorded inside a
certificate or credential document, then it can be assured that if
the cryptographic hash of the dataset under inspection matches
the stored cryptographic hash, then the credential refers to the
same dataset. For example, if the certificate states The dataset
with the cryptographic hash 0x1122EEFF has been sourced
ethically then it will uniquely identify the dataset to which it
refers. Note that cryptographic hash values are typically 256 or
512 bits in length [15], so the structure of the credential would
not likely be readable in sentence form, but the cryptographic
hash would be embedded in the credential in some way, as
Figure 1 illustrates.
Fig. 1. A Credential Document containing a cryptographic hash of a dataset.
Consider the case in which the information in the dataset’s
credential is public information, and can be accessed freely
by anyone. In this case, an authorised representative of the
publisher of the dataset might create a credential document
asserting that the dataset represented by the supplied crypto-
graphic hash has been ethically sourced and make a digital
signature of the document before finally storing the credential
document, the signature and the corresponding public key [16]
in a place where it can be inspected (for example, as part
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of the supporting material for the shared dataset [17]), as
illustrated in Figure 2. Anyone subsequently accessing the
dataset’s distribution archive can use the public key to verify
that the credential document has been signed by the publisher.
As discussed above, the credential document would need to
include a statement along the lines of The dataset with the
cryptographic hash 0x1122EEFF has been sourced ethically
in order to provide an intrinsic link between the credential
document and the dataset it ratifies.
Fig. 2. Signed Credential Package for a dataset instance.
The primary advantage of such a system is that it provides
assurance that the certification document is genuine and has
not been tampered with, and the system relatively simple to
implement as it makes use of well established cryptographic
techniques. The publisher will have to establish a process for
issuing and managing keys, and in particular for safeguarding
access to the private key to ensure that only authorised
representatives of the publisher can access and use it.
There are, however, shortcomings in this scheme: most
notably, a signed credential issued alongside the dataset
cannot be withdrawn or modified if a released dataset is
subsequently found to have issues with its ethical status —
previously-downloaded copies of the dataset will continue to
be accompanied by the credential asserting that the data is
ethically sourced, even if evidence subsequently disproves this.
Furthermore, including the public key inside the distribution
package doesn’t guarantee that the public key belongs to
the claimed signing party — a malicious party could simply
build a new distribution, including a fake certificate signed
with their own key, and include that key in the distribution
package, giving the appearance that everything was in order
whilst propagating false claims about the dataset. This could
be mitigated to some degree by hosting the public key on
a website or other location that was known to be under the
control of the publishing party and then sharing the public
key’s location over a trusted channel. As such, the informal
digital signature-based scheme presented here for verifying a
certification document would benefit from having well-known
mechanisms and structure for sharing public key locations,
and for expressing semantic information about the dataset,
such that processes for signing and metadata verification could
be automated and be more readily interoperable with other
systems and processes.
IV. INTRODUCING SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY
The term Self-sovereign Identity (SSI) [18] is used to
describe the ability of an individual to take ownership of
their personal data and to control who has access to that data,
without the need for centralized infrastructure. For instance,
in a traditional siloed model identity system, a single or
group of identity providers administer the entire system and
usually maintains a centralized repository of user identities.
This makes it challenging for users to have control over their
own data and they depend on administrators for distribution
and verification of data. Another disadvantage of a siloed
model identity system is that it is not portable. The portability
issue of the siloed model is solved by the federated model,
which allows some degree of portability by allowing different
services to share details about a single user; but the user
still does not have complete ownership of their identity. Self-
sovereign identity solves the issue of ownership by allow-
ing users to maintain control over their identity. With the
use of self-sovereign identity, it is possible to secure users
identity information from unauthorized disclosure by allowing
the identity owner to selectively disclose data based on the
requirement from the verifier. The data owner thus has the
ability to decide how their identity and their personal data
should be used and who has access to it.
The SSI community have developed data models and proto-
cols [8] that provide cryptographically verifiable mechanisms
for validating identities and issuing and presenting proofs
of credentials. These mechanisms build on distributed ledger
technologies and linked JSON-LD [19] data documents to
provide immutable proof of control of an identifier, and to
facilitate the secure exchange of credentials based upon these
identifiers between consenting parties.
Whilst a significant focus of effort in the SSI community has
been on personal identity and data privacy for individuals, the
underlying computer science techniques can be applied to any
type of entity, including digital assets and scientific datasets,
where the attention of this paper focuses on demonstrating
that SSI techniques can be used to provide assertions about
the qualities and provenance of a dataset.
V. REPRESENTING ATTRIBUTES AS VERIFIABLE
CREDENTIALS
A core tenet of the decentralised identifier model is that
parties claiming to be the controller of a DID can provide
cryptographic proof that this is the case, facilitated by a
protocol that the DID provides a route to a verification
mechanism. This route is typically provided in the form of
a JSON-LD document containing the public key of the DID,
along with the methods by which a party can verify. By
using the published verification mechanisms the holder of a
document allegedly signed by the DIDs controller can obtain
3
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cryptographic proof that it was indeed signed by the DID
controller, and furthermore can verify that the document has
not been tampered with since it was signed.
This prescriptive mechanism for a party to prove that they
have access to the private keys relating to a DID is utilised
when issuing Verifiable Credentials (VC), which can be as
simple as a document claiming a DID. If the claim document
is signed by a reputable and trusted party, and the DID of
that party is known, then the claims in the document can be
taken to have been issued by the trusted party. In other words,
if a university signs a document using the private key of a
DID they control, then the claims in the document can be
taken to be claims that the university is willing to endorse.
The credential issuer will be the trust anchor in the system,
such that anyone relying on credentials provided by the issuer
will need to have trust in the issuer themselves to place value
on the credentials [20]. Where the issuer is a university, NGO
or other well-regarded organisation this trust may be inherent,
in other cases the issuer may need to source credentials from
bodies with a better established reputation in order to assert
their own qualities as a trustworthy issuer of credentials.
Providing a mechanism to assure verifying parties that a
DID belongs to a known and trusted authority is a governance
challenge, requiring both policies and infrastructure to provide
a white list or other trustworthy records that can be checked.
In the short term, a DID scheme has been proposed which
makes use of the fact that most organisations run web sites, and
typically have certificates proving the legitimacy of the identity
of the web site. The did:web [21] scheme takes advantage of
this by utilising the web site of an organisation to host the DID
document, resolving did:web to a JSON-LD file located on
the web site with a well known path [22] and relying on only
authorised users being able to upload files to an organization’s
official web site.
{
"@context": "https://w3id.org/did/v1
",
"id": "did:web:uniofscience.com",
"authentication": [{
"id": "did:web:uniofscience.com",
"type": "
Ed25519VerificationKey2018",
"controller": "did:web:
uniofscience.com",
"publicKeyBase58": "71ANMccQC..."
}]
...
}
Listing 1. A fragment of the UniOfScience DID Document
An open source software package vc-js [23] can be used to
generate VC documents based on DIDs using many schemes,
including did:web. In order to produce a VC document for an
illustrative dataset, domain names were registered for UniOf-
Science, a fictitious university, and to represent a web site for
the dataset, at DIDdoi.com, and DID Documents were crafted
for each, such that resolving the did:web address through the
published route would reach the appropriate DID Document.
Listing 1 shows part of the DID Document for UniOfScience.
The second required component is a Credential
Schema [24], which defines the semantic vocabulary to
be used to describe the attributes of the dataset and provides
the format in which the claims about a particular subject
will be made. To produce a VC document the vc-js library
was integrated with the Node.js Express [25] framework to
enable a simple web form to be served to allow a user —
perhaps a scientist preparing to publish a dataset — to enter
information about the dataset which was subsequently used
to populate data fields in the credential schema, and vc-js
invoked to encapsulate these values in a Verifiable Credential
JSON-LD document containing a proof issued by the DID
belonging to UniOfScience.
The inclusion of the DID of the issuer (and signatory) of
the VC document enables other parties to verify its state,
which is achieved by resolving the DID to locate the DID
Document holding descriptors of the mechanisms for checking
signatures, usually by provision of the public key. Verifiers
can use methods in vc-js to receive cryptographic proof of
the authenticity of the VC document, assuring them that it
hasnt been tampered with since it was issued. As the payload
of the VC document contains the DID of the dataset that it
refers to, verifiers have cryptographic proof that the issuer has
signed a document attesting to the properties of the DID of the
subject. If the DID relates to a dataset, then the verifier can be
assured that the VC document carries signed assurances about
the properties of the dataset.
Presentation of a VC document provides systematic im-
provements over an ad hoc digitally signed document, through
the publication of the location of the public key of the subjects
and the use of a semantic vocabulary for expressing metadata
claims, but still exhibits shortcomings. Among these is the
possibility for anyone who holds a copy of the VC document
to present it, even though it may no longer be relevant or
valid. If this is done with ill-intent it could be considered
a reply attack [26]. A mechanism to prevent such replay
attacks is for the verifier of a credential claim to ask the
holder to present a Verifiable Proof, which takes the form of
a JSON-LD document signed by the VC holder containing a
challenge, typically a nonce, issued by the verifier along with
the credential and its proof. By inspection of the Verifiable
Proof document through resolution of the DID of its issuer,
and comparing this DID with the DID of the VC’s subject,
the verifier can determine that the challenge response is
acceptable, and that the holder of the VC is still content to
present it. Further verification of the credential contained in
the Verifiable Proof can demonstrate that the credential has not
been tampered with, and thereby provide assurance that a valid
credential about the dataset has been issued by an authorised
party, to a holder who still considers the credential appropriate
to share.
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VI. SELF-SOVEREIGNTY OF DIGITAL ASSETS
The process described thus far has implied that parties
wishing to verify credentials make requests and human op-
erators are on hand to manage private keys and to create
and sign Verifiable Proof documents, which would quickly
become impractical where there was high demand or a need
for a timely response. By considering the scientific dataset as a
self-sovereign entity in its own right, with control over its own
credentials, we can begin to automate these processes using a
construct, exemplified by the open source Hyperledger Aries
project [27] and Evernym’s commercial application libvcx1,
whereby the entity is represented by a software application
(termed an agent) operating on behalf of the entity and
mediating access to the entity’s credentials. In the scenario
presented, a cloud-based software agent (DSA) will represent
the published dataset (DS) and will provide mechanisms to
generate and store the private keys and issued VC documents
securely in a digital wallet. Parties with interests in DS will
interact with the representing agent, DSA, by addressing it
through its publicly shared decentralised identifier (DID).
The dataset publisher will also have a software agent
representing their role in the transactions, with the capability to
issue credentials. The publisher’s agent will be the trust anchor
in the system, such that anyone relying on data credentials
provided by the publisher’s agent will need to have trust in the
publisher themselves in order to place value on the credentials,
as in the did:web scheme described above. For the discussion,
the publisher is a university that employs the scientist who
seeks to share a dataset with the research community.
Fig. 3. A publisher agent (University Agent) interacts and issues credentials
to a dataset agent.
In the first instance the university will configure and launch
a new software process to act as the agent DSA and represent
DS in future transactions. This software process will be part of
the infrastructure provided by an implementation of the DID
protocols, such as the ACA-Py [28] cloud agent component
1https://www.evernym.com
from the Hyperledger Aries project. As part of the commis-
sioning procedure for the agent, a configuration script will be
run to generate a digital wallet for the agent, which will hold
its private keys and credentials, and generate a decentralised
identifier (DID), by which DSA will be addressed.
The university will then establish a secure connection be-
tween their publisher agent and DSA, which will be mani-
fested using DID protocols, and the resultant connection will
be used to issue the appropriate credentials to DSA, as shown
in Figure 3. Credentials are structured according to published
JSON-formatted Credential Definition schema [29] and con-
tain a set of key-value pairs which the issuing party asserts
are true about the holding entity. For example, in Listing 2,
Hash of Data is a credential holding the cryptographic hash
of the dataset, which inextricably links the credential to the
dataset it represents, and Data Ethically Sourced represents
the ethical status of the dataset, as stated by the publisher. A
practical scheme will hold other credentials, and could include
a credential expiry date or other conditions for credential
usage.
{
"Hash of Data": "0xFFEE...AA1122",
"Data Ethically Sourced": "YES"
}
Listing 2. A sample credential set
The DID for the dataset agent, DSA, is a public address,
analogous to a website address, which should be shared in the
downloadable package for the Dataset DS that it represents,
such that users can use this address to request proof of the
credentials of DS. Users of DS will themselves use software
agents to communicate with its agent, DSA, these may be edge
agents stored on a mobile device or cloud agents hosted by a
web service. Any user with knowledge of the DID for DSA
can seek to establish a connection with DSA and to request
proof of the dataset’s credentials via their own agent, and if
the system policies permit, DSA will respond, presenting proof
of the credentials it holds. These credentials will include the
cryptographic hash of the dataset, to provide an inextricable
link to the underlying dataset it represents, along with its
ethical sourcing status, as written in the credential by the
publisher. The public DID of the university will be included
in the returned credential proof, and can be used as a trust
anchor to assure that the credentials originated from the
university. DID protocols ensure that the returned proof is
cryptographically provable to have originated from the issuing
university and to have not expired, been revoked or tampered
with in any way. The architecture for such a scheme is shown
in Figure 4. An implementation of this architecture has been
prototyped through access to a commercial software platform
provided for evaluation by Evernym, and demonstrated to
work as designed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has explored the use of emerging protocols
and data models for decentralised identifiers and verifiable
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Fig. 4. Agents represent parties in the relationship.
credentials, as they can be applied to providing certification
of qualities and attributes of digital assets. The discussion
has been motivated through the use of a hypothetical ethical
certification applied to a scientific dataset, and has described
how decentralised identifiers and verifiable credentials can be
used to provide users of a dataset with access to a well-
structured and semantically-rich digital attestation of qualities
of the dataset.
By building upon concepts and data models from Self-
sovereign Identity research, it is hoped that a standard’s based
approach to credential sharing and verification of properties
of digital assets will emerge, such that users will be able to
leverage a range of interoperable tools and platforms both to
certify and to verify digital assets, whilst taking advantage of
research into the application of advanced techniques including
selective disclosure and zero knowledge proofs to further
the security and privacy preserving capabilities of digital
credentials.
Continuation of the work presented here will look towards
further implementation of the architectures discussed, and in
particular how the proposed approach can be combined with
the widely adopted DOI scheme in order to provide definitive
assurance of attributes and qualities to users of datasets across
scientific fields.
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